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Abstract: There is much of interest in Cassam’s ground-breaking Vices of the Mind (2019). 
This discussion focuses exclusively on one aspect of his view, namely, his account of what it 
takes to be properly criticisable or blameworthy for one’s epistemic vices. This critical 
discussion consists of two sections. The first provides an overview of Cassam’s account of 
responsibility and criticizability for intellectual vices. The second raises a problem for that 
account whose formulation is due to Battaly (2019) and proposes a solution which, at least 
in part, could also be adopted by Cassam himself if he were prepared to make some small 
changes to his view. This solution generates a highly disjunctive account of criticizability and 
responsibility for possessing an epistemic vice. Although such heterogeneity might seem 
wholly unsatisfactory, it receives a plausible explanation when the account is put within the 
context of a Strawsonian approach to the practice of holding people responsible for their 
epistemic vices. 
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Epistemic vices such as closed-mindedness or intellectual arrogance have profound 
consequences. These consequences are almost exclusively negative. Those who suffer from 
these vices are prone to errors and to ignorance. They are also likely to cause epistemic 
harms to other people and to the epistemic groups to which they belong. It is this ability of 
intellectual vices to get in the way of knowledge that is at the root of Cassam’s original 
version of vice epistemology. In his view, only those traits, attitudes and ways of thinking 
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that obstruct knowledge deserve to be thought as epistemic vices. It is for this reason that 
his position is known as obstructivism. 
Intellectual vices, however, are not the only psychological features of agents systematically 
to get in the way of knowledge. Cognitive defects, such as short-sightedness, and cognitive 
biases, such as the confirmation bias, also have profound and persistent consequences that 
are epistemically harmful. In Cassam’s view what distinguishes these shortcomings from 
vices is that cognitive impairments and biases do not reflect badly on their possessors. 
Intellectual vices, instead, are something for which individuals can be blamed or at least can 
be appropriately criticised. 
There is much of interest in Cassam’s ground-breaking Vices of the Mind (2019). This 
discussion focuses exclusively on one aspect of his view, namely, his account of what it takes 
to be properly criticisable or blameworthy for one’s epistemic vices. This critical discussion 
consists of two sections. The first provides an overview of Cassam’s account of responsibility 
and criticizability for intellectual vices. The second raises a problem for that account whose 
formulation is due to Battaly (2019) and proposes a solution which, at least in part, could 
also be adopted by Cassam himself if he were prepared to make some small changes to his 
view. This solution generates a highly disjunctive account of criticizability and responsibility 
for possessing an epistemic vice. Although such heterogeneity might seem wholly 
unsatisfactory, it receives a plausible explanation when the account is put within the context 




1. Cassam on epistemic blame and criticism 
 
In Cassam’s view, an ‘epistemic vice is a blameworthy or otherwise reprehensible character 
trait, attitude, or way of thinking that systematically obstructs the gaining, keeping, or 
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sharing of knowledge' (2019, p. 23).1 This definition encapsulates three essential features of 
obstructivism. First, this position is a form of epistemic consequentialism in the sense that 
epistemic vices are in part distinguished from other psychological features because of their 
epistemically harmful consequences (2019, p. 18). Second, Cassam’s account highlights the 
heterogeneity of epistemic vices. In addition to character traits, such closed-mindedness, 
Cassam is prepared to include attitudes, such as intellectual arrogance, ways of thinking, 
such as, for instance, wishful thinking, and also implicit biases and prejudices (2019, pp. 12-
15). Therefore, features that pertain to different psychological kinds are included among the 
vices. What unifies this otherwise multifarious category are their epistemically bad 
consequences and the fact that individuals are justly criticised or blamed for possessing 
these features. Hence, third, epistemic vices are reprehensible or even blameworthy 
psychological features of agents (2019, p. 22). It is this third aspect of Cassam’s account that 
is my concern here. 
Broadly speaking, in Cassam’s view intellectual vices are epistemic character traits, 
epistemic stances or postures (that is, attitudes) and ways of thinking that are (i) harmful 
and (ii) such that the person who has them is criticisable because of these features since 
they are part of who she ‘truly is’. In addition, in some instances, agents might also be 
responsible for their epistemic vices and thus justly blamed for having them (2019, pp. 22, 
23). In short, epistemic vices are epistemically harmful psychological features such that 
others are warranted in taking a dim view of those who have these qualities on the ground 
that they have them. 
In Cassam’s view blame requires responsibility and responsibility presupposes control (2019, 
pp. 18, 123, 125). He defends this view primarily by appealing to our intuitions about so-
called hard cases. Cassam asks us to consider the predicaments of individuals who have 
been indoctrinated, abused or brainwashed and who are unable to change because they are 
still victims of propaganda campaigns or because they have become so damaged that their 
ways have become set. Cassam suggests that we are not inclined to blame such individuals. 
He also thinks that the reason why we do not apportion blame is that we judge these people 
 
1 In addition, these psychological features must themselves be in some sense epistemic. 
4 
 
to lack control over their vices. It is this lack of control that in Cassam’s view explains why 
we do not hold them responsible, or blame them for their vices (2019, pp. 21-22). 
Cassam considers two dimensions of responsibility: acquisition and revision. He argues that 
individuals are typically not responsible for the acquisition of their epistemic vices since 
character formation occurs in childhood when individuals are immature (2019, p. 128). 
However, Cassam is optimistic about the forward-looking notion of revision responsibility. In 
his view epistemic vices are malleable and individuals can exercise control in ways that lead 
to character change (2019, pp. 134-140). 
Cassam acknowledges that we have no voluntary control over our character traits or 
attitudes since we cannot change them at will. We might, however, have to some extent 
this kind of control over ways of thinking. Be that as it may, he thinks that we can exercise, 
often indirectly, some managerial control over character traits and attitudes (p. 129). For 
example, we can directly manipulate ourselves by changing our behaviour. In this manner, 
we can, for example, indirectly affect our attitudes since these tend to change so to become 
consistent with conduct. We can also through practice modify our traits of character. 
Further, attitudes might be responsive to reasons, when they are, we can also exercise 
evaluative control over them by means of evaluating what is true (p. 126). Ultimately, 
whether and how we can manipulate ourselves with the goal of self-improvement is an 
empirical question. I share Cassam’s optimism, but I will not pursue this matter here. Based 
on these considerations, Cassam concludes that often individuals are responsible for their 
epistemic vices because they are capable of self-improvement. 
But what should we say about the person who is dogmatic as a result of indoctrination? 
Cassam notes that some negative assessment, short of blame, is still in order. We think of 
this person’s dogmatism as a failing, rather than a mere fault or defect, on his part. This 
failing is reprehensible and for this he can be properly criticised, even though we might not 
be prepared to blame him. Cassam relies on Sher (2005) to argue that these psychological 
features warrant criticism because they reflect badly on those who have them.  
Cassam delineates those aspects of intellectual vices that distinguish them from mere 
cognitive shortcomings and that make criticism fitting in the case of vices and unfitting in 
the case of mere defects. The difference is that vices are part of who the person truly is, 
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whilst defects are not (p. 134). To use a vocabulary that I owe to Shoemaker (2015) and 
which I adopt below, vices but not defects are attributable since the former but not the 
latter are elements of agents’ characters. 
One might well wonder about the difference between psychological features that belong to 
a person’s character and those that the person possesses but which are not part of who she 
is. In this context Cassam’s invokes Smith’s (2008) distinction between deep and superficial 
assessments of people. Deep evaluations capture what is definitional about the kind of 
person or thinker one is, whilst superficial evaluations focus on features that would be less 
important (Cassam, 2019, pp. 133-134).2 
Given the weight that this distinction is meant to bear it is surprising that Cassam does not 
attempt to supply a more robust account of the difference between deep and superficial 
evaluations of the self. Shoemaker’s view of attributability (2015) can be deployed to plug 
this gap.3 In his theory deep evaluations are those that single out those aspects of an 
individual’s psychology that are causally responsible for her commitments (in the form of 
the evaluations she endorses) and her cares (in the form of the attitudes that she identifies 
with) and that in addition are coherent with the contents of these commitments and cares 
(2015, p. 59). Armed with this characterisation we can explain why the evaluation of a 
person as arrogant is deep whilst the evaluation of another as short-sighted is not. 
Intellectual arrogance is a posture that is causally responsible for, and finds its expression in, 
many of the endorsed evaluations and authentic concerns of the arrogant person. Short-
sightedness does not play such a role. The same can be said of other cognitive defects, even 
those which, like some learning disabilities, have pervasive effects on the person who has 
 
2 I presume here that being a certain kind of thinker is part of the sort of person one is. I do not supply 
arguments here for this assumption that, in my view, I share with Cassam. I base my interpretation on 
passages where he explicitly commits to it. For instance, he writes that someone can be criticised for his 
gullibility and foolishness because these “traits are not separate from him; they are a part of him and who is” 
(p. 134). Earlier on the same page Cassam contrast what contributes to making one the kind of thinker one is 
with what makes one the kind of person one is. I take it that the point of the contrast is to draw attention to 
the fact the first set of factors is a proper subset of the latter, so that some features make one the person one 
is without contributing to making one the kind of thinker one is. 
3 I rely on Shoemaker’s rather than on other views of the deep self as a basis for attributions of responsibility 
primarily for two reasons. Firstly, his account includes authoritative judgments and authentic cares within the 
deep self. Other existing theories usually focus on one aspect only. It is plausible to think, with Cassam, that 
epistemic vices include character traits that manifest the person’s evaluative judgments but also attitudes with 
which the person identifies. Shoemaker’s account would thus be best placed to accommodate all aspects of 
epistemic vices. In addition, Shoemaker offers an account of responsibility based on the study of responsibility-
responses. This is the approach I endorse in this article. 
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them. The person who is cognitively impaired often has cares and commitments that are not 
shaped by her impairment. The disability might constrain which commitments and cares a 
person is able to have but the cares and commitments she has, and that express who she is, 
are often not expressions of her disability.4 
Before raising in the next section a problem for Cassam’s account of criticizability and 
responsibility for epistemic vices and offering a solution that Cassam could at least in part 
embrace with little modification of his view, I complete my overview of his position on this 
issue by way of a clarification. 
Cassam admits the existence of occasions in which a person is responsible for their vices 
despite lacking control over their revisability. This can happen in some cases where the 
person is not motivated to revise their character and attitudes, or she is not aware that she 
possesses the questionable features which she should change. Arguably, this individual lacks 
managerial control over her epistemic vices since in order to exercise this control one must 
be aware of the vices’ existence and be motivated to do something about them. Intuitively, 
however, there are instances where ignorance of one’s viciousness and disinterest in 
addressing it does not absolve one from blame. These are cases where the person is at fault 
for being the kind of individual who lacks the requisite control. It is for this reason that such 
an agent is responsible for her vices and thus deserving of blame. 
 
2. The responsibility problem and a Strawsonian solution 
 
In a recent article Battaly (2019) has challenged virtue epistemologists to provide better 
accounts of what responsibility for intellectual virtues and vices might involve. In particular, 
she raises a dilemma for Cassam’s account. In this section I explain why Cassam could have 
an answer to the problem raised by Battaly if he were prepared to make some changes to 
his view. This answer, however, were he to adopt it, would leave him with a disjunctive 
account of criticizability and responsibility for epistemic vice. I conclude the section by 
 
4 In some cases, however, one might endorse an impairment as a matter of identity. In such cases, the 
impairment becomes part of who one is but is usually also not seen as a shortcoming. 
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providing an account of responsibility that explains why we should expect this variety since 
people might be the target of different kinds of negative evaluations because of their vices. 
In Battaly’s view, Cassam is unable to explain satisfactorily responsibility for implicit biases. 
She notes that Cassam wishes to count these as epistemic vices whilst wishing to exclude 
cognitive impairments (p. 7). Battaly asks us to consider a person who genuinely holds 
egalitarian beliefs whilst harbouring prejudicial implicit biases. We could think of this 
person, for instance, as displaying the characteristics of aversive racists (cf., Gendler, 2011). 
This individual believes in the equality of all racial groups and her belief is sincerely held. 
Nevertheless, she also tends to associate some stigmatised racial groups with negative 
features such as being violent, for example. This person appears to be racially biased as 
measured by Implicit Association Tests. The fact that she suffers from these biases might 
also affect her conduct toward members of the group she is biased against. 
Battaly formulates her objection to Cassam as a dilemma detailing two exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive options but such that neither offers a satisfactory answer to the 
responsibility problem for implicit biases. She notes that either implicit biases reflect badly 
on the person who has them, or they do not. There are no other options. The first option 
holds that implicit biases do not reflect badly on agents. If this is the case, these biases are 
not part of the kind of thinker one is. Yet, for Cassam individuals are responsible for their 
implicit biases, since these are included among the epistemic vices. Therefore, individuals 
must be blameworthy for their implicit biases even though these do not reflect badly on 
them. Battaly argues that this option is not available to Cassam because he thinks that 
“blameworthiness is a subset of reprehensibility” (Battaly, 2019, p. 4). Hence, contrary to 
the option entertained here in Cassam’s view nothing could be blameworthy without being 
also reprehensible. 
Hence, Cassam would be forced to adopt the second option. This is the view that implicit 
biases reflect badly on the person who possesses them. But if this is the case, Battaly 
continues, these biases must be counted amongst the deep features of the self and defining 
of the kind of thinker one is (2019, p. 7).5 However, if something like an implicit bias 
 
5 Battaly suspects that this would be Cassam’s favourite option. This is indeed his favourite option (private 
communication). He denies however that cognitive impairments are part of the thinker one is. For this reason, 
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warrants inclusion in the deep self then it is hard to see why cognitive impairments such as 
short-sightedness should be excluded (p.7). Yet, everyone agrees that these disabilities do 
not reflect badly on those who have them. 
Battaly is correct in her claim that Cassam explicitly commits to the claim that the vices for 
which one is responsible are a subset of those for which one is open to criticism. This claim 
forbids him for adopting the first of the two options outlined by Battaly. However, to my 
knowledge, he only makes that commitment once on p. 22. He does not offer any detailed 
argument in its support. In addition, this conclusion is not entailed by his official definition 
of blameworthiness. 
Further, there are independent reasons, also to be found in Cassam, to resist adopting it. To 
appreciate this, it is enough to note that one can be blamed for ways of thinking that are 
out of character and do not reflect on whom one truly is. Cassam is willing to countenance 
wishful thinking as a vice in a person who is not a ‘fully fledged wishful thinker’ although he 
engages ‘in the occasional spot of wishful thinking’ (p. 13). Wishful thinking is thus not 
defining of who this person truly is. Therefore, it does not reflect badly on him in the sense 
highlighted above. As a matter of fact, his wishful thinking might be really sporadic and even 
out of character. Yet, for all of this, this person might be fully responsible for his wishful 
thinking and therefore blameworthy because of it. 6 
I speculate that both Cassam and Battaly are drawn to the view that responsibility entails 
reprehensibility because of a focus on intellectual character vices. These are by definition 
part of the deep self.7 But Cassam’s view is that epistemic vices are heterogeneous and this 
heterogeneity extends so far to include psychological qualities that are not part of the 
person’s character and whose expression might even be out of character.  None of these 
considerations by themselves speak against agents’ blameworthiness for these qualities. 
In short, it is open to Cassam, without needing much change to his position, to adopt the 
first option in the dilemma she poses to him, rather than be forced to claim that implicit 
 
whilst implicit biases reflect badly on agents, cognitive impairments do not. In my view a defence of these 
conclusions requires a clearer account of the deep self than Cassam supplies. 
6 These would be examples of what Cassam thinks as vicious thinking in the absence of thinking vices proper 
(2019, p. 79). 
7 On this point see n. 2 above. 
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biases must be part of the kind of person one is.8 He could thus respond to Battaly by 
claiming that we are responsible for our implicit biases because we have managerial control 
over them. That is, by manipulating ourselves, we can  eliminate these biases or at least 
reduce their effects. We would nevertheless not be criticisable because of these features 
since they are not part of the kind of thinker we are.9 
This approach is commendable also because, provided Cassam adopted the account of the 
deep self that I proposed above, he could easily explain why the second option of the 
dilemma formulated by Battaly is false. Implicit biases are not among the agent’s 
authoritative commitments since they are at odds with the person’s genuinely held beliefs. 
They are also not among her authentic cares because she does not identify with the 
attitudes the biases express. If this is right, implicit biases are not part of a person’s 
character; this is why they do not reflect badly on her. However, agents are responsible for 
their implicit biases, but not for their impairments, because they have some control over the 
former and none over the latter.  
Nevertheless, there is something unsatisfactory about the solution to the dilemma that I 
have offered here on Cassam’s behalf. This proposed solution adopts a disjunctive account 
of epistemic vice as a psychological feature that is epistemically harmful and (i) either 
blameworthy or (ii) reprehensible. So, all vices are epistemically harmful. But only some 
vices are also qualities for which people are responsible, and therefore, blameworthy, even 
though these qualities do not reflect badly on them because they are not part of people’s 
deep selves. Other vices are, instead, features for which individuals are reprehensible 
without being blameworthy. These vices are properties that reflect badly on the person who 
has them even though that person is not responsible for this fact. Finally, there would also 
be vices for which people are both reprehensible and blameworthy since these are 
properties that reflect badly on them and for which they are responsible. This solution to 
 
8 Cassam’s conceptions of agency and self-knowledge might give him further reasons to resist the approach I 
am inviting him to accept. Thanks to the reviewer for raising this possibility. 
9 I thus agree with the reviewer’s comment that option one might only seem closed if one adopts a folk 
understanding of blameworthiness and reprehensibility where these interchangeably indicate that a person is 
criticisable because of their badness. This is tantamount to forgetting that ‘reprehensibility’ has a narrow 
technical definition in this context. 
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Battaly’s dilemma comes at a cost unless we also supply an explanation for the duality of 
responsibility as blameworthiness or reprehensibility.  
One might argue that the explanation for the disjunctive character of responsibility lies in  
the heterogeneity of the epistemic vices. However, this answer only invites a further 
question about the notion of epistemic vice. That is, one might ask now for an account of 
the conditions that must be met for some quality to be an epistemic vice. If responsibility 
figures among these conditions, the explanation becomes circular. In my view, this circle is 
so small to be unilluminating. We might as well say that it is a brute fact that both epistemic 
vices and responsibility for them are heterogeneous categories. Cassam might well be happy 
to accept that this is the way things are.  
In what follows I want to suggest that we do not need to stop here. We can supply an 
explanation why when we charge someone with a vice we are doing at least one of two 
things: blaming the person for the vice and/or showing our disdain or disapproval of the 
person for the kind of thinker they are. It is this explanation that also provides some unity to 
the definition of epistemic vice. In what follows I cannot defend the details of the account, 
instead I merely wish to advance it as a supplement to Cassam’s theory.10 
I propose that we start thinking about responsibility by considering the practice of holding 
other people responsible. This practice involves the expression of reactive attitudes such as 
resentment, admiration, gratitude, and anger directed at others because of who they are 
and what they have done. Several of these responses can be thought to involve something 
akin to blame or praise because they are not mere gradings or appraisals but are ways of 
expressing approval and disapproval. These blame- or praise-related responses are varied 
but they include the following pairings: disesteem or disdain, esteem or admiration; 
disapproval, approval; anger, blame, and resentment; warm feelings, praise and gratitude. 
We can impose some order on these varied reactive attitudes if we think of them as 
responses to the quality of the character, judgment, or regard of the person to whom they 
are directed. Disesteem or disdain for a person indicates disapproval of their character, 
 
10 For a defence see Ch. 8 of my forthcoming The Mismeasure of the Self: A Study in Vice Epistemology. In some 
regard my view is radically different from Cassam’s since I propose to sidestep the issue of control that is the 
central feature of Cassam’s account of responsibility. 
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whilst esteem and admiration indicate approval of the same. Approval and satisfaction or 
disapproval and disappointment can be directed at a person because of the quality of their 
judgment. Anger, blame and resentment indicate disapproval of a person for her failure to 
give due weight to our perspective and interests; warm feelings, praise and gratitude are 
responses to those who show due regard toward us. 
Of course, these responses can fail to fit the situation. A person could mistakenly be angry 
at someone. This person might have misunderstood that individual’s conduct as expressing 
lack of due regard when it did not. Conversely, one could fail to feel angry when one should. 
Hence, if we want to understand the nature of responsibility by exploring the reactive 
attitudes involved in the practice of holding people responsible, we must focus on those 
responses that are fitting or appropriate.11 When approached in this way three forms or 
faces of responsibility emerge.12 
The first face is attributability responsibility. It is the responsibility that individuals have for 
their character or deep self. More specifically, it is the responsibility agents have for those 
features of the self that cause, and are expressed in, the commitments that they endorse 
and the concerns with which they identify. Others manifest their disapproval of these 
features through disdain and disesteem and their approval by way of esteem and 
admiration. In this manner we hold individuals responsible for their character even though 
its quality might be something that they are not able to change (Shoemaker, 2015, ch. 1). 
The second face is answerability responsibility. It is the kind of responsibility to which we 
hold people when we demand that they answer for their beliefs and conduct by supplying 
reasons to justify them. Thus, individuals are responsible in this sense for actions and beliefs 
that are caused by, and give expression to, their judgement. Others manifest their 
disapproval of these features by means of various expressions of disapprobation and 
disappointment; they manifest approval through expressions of approbation and 
satisfaction (Shoemaker, 2015, ch. 2). Arguably, individuals are not fully answerable for their 
epistemic vices since these are not features of the self that they would be prepared to 
 
11 I set aside the question whether fitting responsibility responses constitute responsibility or whether they 
track the independent properties whose possession is necessary and sufficient for responsibility. 
12 I owe this tripartite definition and the characterisation of each face of responsibility to Shoemaker (2015). 
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defend or justify. On the contrary, having epistemic vices means that one’s capacity for 
judgment is impaired so that one’s answerability is diminished. 
The third face is accountability responsibility. It is the kind of responsibility to which we hold 
people when we expect them to redress a slight. We express this response through anger to 
indicate that we find that slight to be caused by, and be an expression of, their lack of 
regard for our point of view. Such lack of regard might consist in failing to even consider 
others’ point of view, in disregarding it or in giving it insufficient weight. It is perfectly 
possible to hold people to account for psychological features which we do not take to be 
part of their character (Shoemaker, 2015, ch. 3). The occasionally careless thinker might 
anger us when her carelessness has harmful consequences that impact upon us. We can feel 
this way even if, provided she has no excuse, we think that such carelessness is for her out 
of character. 
These three dimension of responsibility highlight that we might be doing different things 
when we hold people responsible for their good- and bad-making features. We might 
indicate that we take them to be an exemplar to emulate or a bad example to shun. We 
might ask them for a justification. We might express gratitude or demand an 
acknowledgement or even a change in behaviour. The variety in the practices of holding 
people responsible explains why responsibility is an heterogeneous notion. It takes different 
forms because we approve and disapprove of people in different ways depending on what 
we are trying to achieve through the expression of these reactive attitudes. 
If this is right, we should try to understand responsibility for vices by looking at the purposes 
served by the practice of charging others with them. What is the point of calling someone 
arrogant or closed-minded? Unlike Kidd (2016), I do not believe that these are primarily 
attempts to describe people’s psychology. Rather, these speech acts serve different 
purposes. Two especially come to mind. The first is to expose the person as a negative 
exemplar as a way of encouraging others to distance themselves from, and avoid 
resembling, the vicious individual. This is the purpose served by many familiar cautionary 
tales such Aesop’s fable of a rooster that having defeated his enemy crows about his success 
only to be swept up by an eagle (“The Fighting Cocks”, Perry Index 281). The second is to 
demand a response from the person one has evaluated negatively. The expected responses 
might range from an apology, an action to redress the harm one has caused or at least an 
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acknowledgment that it has occurred. When we refer to someone as vicious then we might 
be doing at least one of two things: holding them up as an exemplar to avoid or reproaching 
them in a way that requires a response from them. 
If disapproving of someone as vicious plays these distinct roles it is no surprise that the 
conditions that must be met for disapprobation to be warranted are somewhat disjunctive. 
First, when we expose someone as a negative exemplar to shun, we enjoin others to avoid 
becoming similar in character to that person.13 Since disapproval is used as a warning to 
third parties, it is wholly irrelevant whether the disesteemed individual is capable of change. 
Second, when we reproach someone, we expect a response from that person. What is 
important in this case will depend on the nature of the response that is demanded. It might 
range from an apology, a justification, or a change in behaviour. Some of these responses 
require that the reproached individual be able to change but some do not. Hence, it is only if 
the reproach takes the form of a demand for change that control over the reproachable 
feature might be necessary. However, if what is demanded is an apology or an 
acknowledgement, this form responsibility might not depend on the possibility to enact 
some kind of change. 
In conclusion, I have argued that Cassam could have an answer to Battaly’s responsibility 
challenge without substantially altering his position. That answer would leave him with a 
disjunctive account of criticizability and responsibility for vice. Such an account might be 
thought to be unsatisfactory because of its lack unity. I have addressed this additional 
concern by means of a Strawsonian backstory that explains why we should expect 
responsibility for epistemic vice to be a heterogeneous notion.14 
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